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ABSTRACT
We randomly vary religious identity salience in laboratory subjects to test how identity salience contributes
to six hypothesized links from prior literature between religious identity and economic behavior. We
find that religious identity salience makes Protestants increase contributions to public goods. Catholics
decrease contributions to public goods, expect others to contribute less to public goods, and become
less risk averse. Jews more strongly reciprocate as an employee in a bilateral labor market gift-exchange
game. We find no evidence of religious identity salience effects on disutility of work effort, discount
rates, or generosity in a dictator game.
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Scholars have long hypothesized that religious identities affect economic outcomes. 
However, causal inference about the effect of religion has been hampered by the difficulty of 
identifying exogenous variation in religious identities. Religious affiliation—even when 
inherited from one’s parents—is likely to be correlated with many unobserved factors (e.g., 
social network composition, educational quality) that have causal impacts on economic behavior. 
In this paper, we use a technique from experimental psychology to create exogenous 
variation in one channel through which religious identities could affect behavior: the salience of 
religious identity to the person affiliated with that identity. Religious identity will be salient at 
least some of the time to anybody who belongs to a religious category, so laboratory identity 
salience manipulations allow us to measure how behavior is likely to be affected by identity 
affiliation during those times. 
We examine how religious identity salience might contribute to six hypothesized links 
between religious identity and economic behavior found in the previous literature: 
 
H1. Contributions to public goods are affected positively by Protestantism and negatively by 
Catholicism (Putnam, 1993; La Porta et al., 1997). 
H2. Trust is affected positively by Protestantism and negatively by Catholicism, and trust is the 
mechanism explaining the relationship between religion and public goods contributions 
(Putnam, 1993; La Porta et al., 1997). 
H3. Financial risk-taking is affected by religion. Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2011) argue that risk-
taking is reduced by Protestantism, and Hoffmann (2000) notes that the Catholic Church has 
often been criticized by other religious bodies for promoting gambling through bingo and 
other charitable gaming events. Hilary and Hui (2009) argue instead that risk-taking is 
reduced by both Protestantism and Catholicism.  
H4. Thrift and capital accumulation are promoted by religion (Weber, 1930; Guiso, Sapienza, 
and Zingales, 2003; Barro and McCleary, 2003, 2006). 
H5. Generosity is increased by religion (Friedrichs, 1960; Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis, 
1993). 
H6. Work ethic is increased by religion, and especially by Protestantism (Weber, 1930; Barro 
and McCleary, 2003, 2006). 
   3
To operationalize these hypotheses in a laboratory setting, we map them into seven 
outcomes that can be measured using standard experimental methods. The first five outcomes are 
contributions to a laboratory public good, expectations about others’ contributions to the 
laboratory public good, elicited risk aversion, elicited discount rates, and the amount given away 
in a dictator game. Since work ethic could be interpreted as a low disutility of effort or as a high 
reciprocity motive toward an employer when labor contracts are incomplete, we measure two 
outcomes corresponding to each of these concepts: the number of anagrams attempted at a 
constant piece-rate wage, and the rate at which effort expended as a worker rises with wage 
offers in a labor market bilateral gift-exchange game. 
The results from the public goods game indicate that identity salience effects may 
contribute to the cross-sectional correlations between religion, contributions to public goods, and 
trust documented by Putnam (1993) and La Porta et al. (1997). We find that religious identity 
salience increases Protestants’ contributions to the laboratory public good, while it causes 
Catholics to decrease contributions. Catholic identity salience decreases expectations of others’ 
contributions to the public good, and it has no statistically significant effect on contributions 
once its impact on trust is controlled for. Protestant identity salience does not appear to affect 
trust, however, suggesting that its positive impact on public good contributions does not operate 
through a trust channel. 
In accordance with the correlation between religion and financial risk-taking found by 
Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2011), we find that religious identity salience causes Protestants to 
become relatively more risk averse than Catholics. But in our data, this is because Catholic 
identity salience increases risk-taking, not because Protestant identity salience decreases it. 
We find no evidence for Judeo-Christian identity salience effects on discount rates and 
generosity. Nor do we find Christian work ethic effects.
1 However, we do find a work ethic 
effect for Judaism that we had not hypothesized; among Jews, priming religion increases the rate 
at which workers increase their effort in response to higher wages in the gift-exchange game. 
Why does identity salience affect behavior? A leading perspective in the psychology 
literature is “self-categorization theory,” which has a long history (James, 1890; Turner, 1985). 
According to this theory, each person belongs to multiple social categories, such as religion, 
                                                 
1 The lack of Christian work ethic effects and the divergence between Protestant and Catholic public good 
contribution effects may be consistent with the survey evidence of Arruñada (2010).   4
gender, and occupation, each of which has its own set of norms—prescriptions about how a 
member of a category should behave. Behavior in a given moment is more powerfully affected 
by the norms of categories that are salient than the norms of categories that are not salient. If an 
environmental cue, or a “prime,” makes a certain category temporarily more salient, behavior 
shifts towards the salient category’s norms. To clarify this self-categorization theory 
interpretation, we describe a simple economic model of identity salience effects. According to 
the model, priming effects reveal the sign of the marginal impact of category norms on steady-
state preferences. The model also highlights a number of reasons why the magnitude of identity 
salience effects, as well as any failure to find an identity salience effect, are difficult to interpret. 
Other researchers have manipulated religious identity salience and measured changes in 
subsequent generosity in a dictator game (Shariff and Norenzayan, 2007; Ahmed and Salas, 
2011), risk choices (Hilary and Hui, 2009), willingness to take pamphlets from a charity (Pichon, 
Boccato, and Saroglou, 2007), cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma game (Horton, Rand, and 
Zeckhauser, 2010; Ahmed and Salas, 2011), cheating on a laboratory task (Randolph-Seng and 
Nielsen, 2007; Mazar, Amir, and Ariely, 2008), and work effort on an unsolvable anagram task 
(Toburen and Meier, 2010). Our outcome measures are chosen specifically to test existing 
hypotheses in the economics literature. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to measure the 
impact of religious priming on public good contributions, expectations of others’ public good 
contributions, gift-exchange choices, and discount rates. When our outcome measures overlap 
with the prior literature, our results are distinguished by the fact that they are elicited under 
incentive compatibility and using much larger sample sizes. In addition, unlike previous 
research, we measure separate effects for each religion. 
In related experimental economics work, Eckel and Grossman (2005), Hoff and Pandey 
(2006, 2011), Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini (2007), Chen et al. (2011), and Chen and Chen 
(forthcoming) find that group identity effects on behavior are increasing in the salience of group 
membership. 
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the pilot experiment we used to 
confirm that our priming instrument has the desired effect on religious identity salience. Section 
II describes the methodology of our main experiment. Section III presents the main experiment’s 
empirical results, including a joint hypothesis test to address concerns about Type I error due to 
multiple hypothesis testing. Section IV describes a theoretical framework for making inferences   5
about identity norms if self-categorization is the mechanism that generates our identity salience 
effects. Section V concludes. 
 
I. Validating the Priming Instrument 
The priming instrument, first used by Shariff and Norenzyan (2007) to study the effect of 
priming religious concepts, is a sentence-unscrambling task where subjects are asked to drop the 
irrelevant word in a five-word group and rearrange the remainder to form a four-word sentence. 
For example, “yesterday it finished track he” becomes “he finished it yesterday.” Each subject 
unscrambles ten sentences. 
The sentences vary depending on whether the subject is in the religion-salient condition 
or the control condition. Five of the sentences unscrambled by religion-salient subjects contain 
religious content. These five sentences are: “she felt the spirit,” “the dessert was divine,” “give 
thanks to God,” “the book was sacred,” and “prophets reveal the future.” None of the control 
subjects’ sentences contain religious content.
2 
We recruited 91 students at the University of Michigan for a pilot experiment to confirm 
that the priming instrument increases the salience of religious identity. Subjects were randomly 
assigned to complete the religion-salient task or the control task. Subjects were not aware that 
this task differed across subjects. Immediately after the sentence unscramble, the questionnaire 
asked: “What five aspects of your identity (such as ‘male/female’ or ‘college student’) are most 
important to you?” Forty-seven percent of subjects in the religion-salient condition listed a 
religious identity in response, compared to only 25 percent of subjects in the control condition.
3 
This difference is significant at the 3 percent level (z-statistic = 2.16). 
                                                 
2 An advantage of this priming instrument is that it is subtle; compared with blatant primes, subtle primes more 
reliably cause behavior to conform to norms (Wheeler and Petty, 2001), which aids in interpreting our results within 
the framework described in Section IV. Word-based puzzles are also used as primes in the economics literature by 
Matthey (2010), who finds that priming the concept of material achievements increases risk-taking, and by 
Drouvelis, Metcalfe, and Powdthavee (2010), who find that priming cooperative concepts increases public good 
game contributions. A potential disadvantage of this priming manipulation for our purposes is that “spirit” and 
“divine” may be less relevant to Jewish identity than they are to Catholic and Protestant identities, perhaps making 
our manipulation weaker for Jewish participants. Since eliciting subjects’ religion before the prime might have 
caused all subjects to become primed, we could not vary the manipulation by religion. 
3 The fact that only 47 percent of subjects in the religion-salient condition listed a religious identity should not be 
interpreted as showing that the priming instrument is ineffective at making religion salient in half of all religious 
subjects. In our main experimental sample of Cornell students, about one-third identified themselves as atheists or 
agnostics. Although we did not elicit religious affiliations from our Michigan subjects (other than the ones who 
listed their religious affiliation as one of their top five identities), if a third of them were atheists or agnostics, then   6
We were concerned, however, that even if the prime succeeds in making religious 
identity more salient, it might also make related identity categories more salient. In that case, any 
priming effects we observe might be due to these other identity categories. To address this 
possibility, we tested whether the identity salience manipulation affected how frequently subjects 
mentioned any other identity besides religion. In descending order of frequency, subjects listed: 
gender, student, nationality/ethnicity, personality trait, family relationship, professional interest, 
non-family relationship, age group, activity group, political orientation, physical feature, and 
socioeconomic class. For each of these other identities, the p-value for a test of differences 
across conditions in the proportion of subjects who mentioned it varied from 25 to 97 percent. 
This evidence suggests that the priming instrument increases religious category salience without 
affecting the salience of other categories that are possibly correlated with religious categories. 
 
II. Main Experiment Procedure 
Participants in the main experiment were 827 Cornell University students. To avoid 
making religious identity salient to all the subjects, we did not mention in our recruiting 
materials that we were looking for people of particular religions. Sessions were administered by 
computer, most using the program z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) but some using VBA for 
Microsoft Excel, depending on which dependent variables we measured in the session.  
  Within each experimental session, we randomly assigned subjects to complete the 
religion-salient or control sentence unscramble. Subjects were not aware that this task differed 
across subjects. After completing the sentence unscramble, they participated in strategic games, 
incentive-compatible preference elicitations, and an anagram-solving task. We describe the 
games, elicitations, and anagram task below. Subjects were told at the beginning of the 
experimental session that any interactions they had with other subjects would be anonymous, 
one-shot interactions. In order to avoid excessively long sessions, each subject engaged in only a 
subset of the post-unscramble tasks.
4 The order in which the post-unscramble tasks appeared 
varied across sessions.
5 
                                                                                                                                                             
about 70 percent of primed religious subjects listed religion as one of their top five identities. Of course, the top-five 
measure does not detect instances where religious identity became more salient but did not ascend to the top five. 
4 Two hundred fifteen subjects were in sessions that administered only the following four sections after the sentence 
unscramble: the dictator game, the public goods game, the risk preference elicitation, and the time preference 
elicitation. Three hundred forty-eight subjects were in sessions that administered only the following three sections 
after the sentence unscramble: the dictator game, the public goods game, and the labor market gift-exchange game.   7
 
A. Public goods game 
We measured the willingness to contribute to a public good by assigning each subject to a 
group of four and endowing him or her with $1.
6 Subjects could contribute any fraction of their 
dollar to a group account, which is the laboratory public good. Contributions were doubled and 
then distributed evenly among the four group members. Subjects kept any money that they did 
not contribute. Total group earnings are maximized (at $2 per group member) if each member 
contributes his or her entire dollar to the group account. However, in the absence of other-
regarding preferences, it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing, since the private return on 
a contribution is –50 percent. 
  Before eliciting subjects’ own contributions, we asked subjects to give their best guess of 
how much the other three members of their group would contribute on average—a measure of 
trust.
7 In order to keep the game’s instructions relatively simple, we did not make subjects’ 
payments depend upon the value of this guess. 
  Existing evidence suggests that behavior in laboratory public goods games like ours is 
associated with contributions to public goods outside the laboratory. Carpenter and Seki 
(forthcoming) find that cooperativeness in a laboratory public good game is positively correlated 
with the productivity of Japanese fishermen who pool their catch with other fishermen, and Fehr 
and Leibbrandt (2008) find that Brazilian fishermen who contribute more to a laboratory public 
good are less likely to over-exploit their common fishing ground. Laury and Taylor (2008) find 
                                                                                                                                                             
One hundred twenty-one subjects were in sessions that administered only the following three sections: the time 
preference elicitation, the risk preference elicitation, and the anagram work ethic task. One hundred forty-three 
subjects participated in sessions that administered only the anagram work ethic task. Sessions occurred between 
April 2008 and December 2009.   
5 We have examined how the strength of the priming effect varied with the length of time elapsed since the priming 
manipulation. The effects on Jewish gift-exchange reciprocity and Catholic risk aversion may weaken over time, 
while the effects on Protestant and Catholic public goods contributions and Catholic trust appear to strengthen over 
time, but we put little weight on these possible trends because very few of the interactions between the priming 
effect and task order are statistically significant. 
6 Marwell and Ames (1979) were the first to run this type of experiment to study the willingness to contribute to 
public goods. 
7 We use the term “trust” in the sense of La Porta et al. (1997, p. 333): trust is when “people expect certain fair or 
cooperative behavior of their opponents even when they do not expect to see them again.” See also Gächter, 
Herrmann, and Thöni (2004) for an explication of how trust applies to a simultaneous-move public goods game.   8
that the amount contributed to a laboratory public good is positively correlated with the 
willingness to contribute money to a local tree-planting organization.
8 
 
B. Risk aversion elicitation 
We elicited small-stakes risk preferences by asking participants to make six binary 
choices between $1 for sure and a 50 percent chance at a larger amount, ranging from $1.60 to 
$3.60. The outcome of each gamble was independent, and we paid subjects for all six choices in 
accordance with their stated preferences; for example, if a subject selected the gamble if and only 
if winning the gamble yielded $3.60, then she would have a 50 percent chance of earning $5 and 
a 50 percent chance of earning $5 + $3.60 = $8.60 in this section. We measured larger-stakes 
risk preferences with six analogous choices, where the monetary amounts were 100 times larger 
than the small-stakes risk choice amounts and there was only a small chance that the subject’s 
choices would be implemented for payment.
9 The section’s instructions made it clear that the 
questions were not intended to evaluate subjects normatively: “It’s important to keep in mind 
that there are no right or wrong answers here. Which choice you make is a matter of personal 
preference.” We used this same wording again in the instructions for the discount rate 
elicitations. 
Risk aversion measures derived from incentive-compatible experimental choices such as 
ours are highly correlated with measures from hypothetical choices, which in turn predict risky 
behaviors such as smoking, drinking, failing to hold insurance, holding stocks rather than 
Treasury bills, being self-employed, switching jobs, and moving residences.
10 
 
C. Discount rate elicitation 
We measured time preferences by asking participants to make 12 binary choices between 
receiving $10 now and receiving some larger amount one week from now, and another 12 binary 
                                                 
8 However, Laury and Taylor (2008) find that this relationship is driven by the most selfish subjects, and that 
differences in contributions among less selfish subjects do not reliably predict differences in contributions to the 
field public good. This may be because the choices about contributing to the laboratory public good and the field 
public good occurred close together in time. Virtuous behavior tends to encourage more selfish behavior 
subsequently due to the “licensing effect” (Khan and Dhar, 2006); because an individual has bolstered his self-
concept as a virtuous person through the initial virtuous act, he is freed to act selfishly afterwards. 
9 One of the six large-stakes risk choices was randomly chosen to be paid out if the subject could correctly predict 
two spins of a roulette wheel, which implied a one in 1,444 chance of one large-stakes risk choice being 
implemented. 
10 See Barsky et al. (1997), Guiso and Paiella (2008), Dohmen et al. (2005), and Sahm (2007).   9
choices between receiving $10 one week from now and receiving some larger amount two weeks 
from now. The larger delayed amounts ranged from $10.10 to $15. After a subject made these 
choices, we randomly selected one of the 24 choices and paid the subject according to his or her 
stated preference in this choice. All payments were made by a check given to the participant 
immediately following the experiment. Delayed payments were implemented via post-dated 
check.
11  
  Our approach to measuring time preferences is standard (Frederick, Loewenstein, and 
O’Donoghue, 2002). Similar measures predict variation in discounting-related behaviors such as 
drug addiction, cigarette smoking, excessive gambling, use of commitment savings devices, 
borrowing on installment accounts and credit cards, rapid exhaustion of food stamps, delayed 
application to an MBA program, and defaulting on loans.
12 
 
D. Dictator game 
In our implementation of the dictator game (Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 
1994), we endowed each subject with $1 and randomly assigned him or her to another participant 
in the session. The subject could choose to give any portion of that $1 to the other subject. A 
profit-maximizing individual would keep the entire dollar for himself, so the amount given away 
is a measure of pure altruism. Benz and Meier (2008) find that generosity in laboratory dictator 
games is positively correlated with charitable giving outside the laboratory. 
 
E. Labor market tasks 
Work ethic can be interpreted in terms of economic theory as relating to an individual’s 
disutility of effort, which determines the willingness to exert a contracted-upon amount of effort 
at a given wage rate, or the strength of the reciprocity motive toward an employer that causes a 
worker to supply more effort in response to a higher wage when the labor contract is incomplete. 
We measure identity effects on both variables.  
To measure identity effects on the disutility of effort, we asked subjects to solve as many 
four-letter anagrams as they could in a five-minute period. We paid participants five cents per 
                                                 
11 If the subject received a delayed payment for this section, then earnings from other sections were paid through a 
separate check that was immediately cashable. 
12 See Fuchs (1982), Bickel, Odum, and Madden (1999), Kirby, Petry, and Bickel (1999), Petry and Casarella 
(1999), Kirby and Petry (2004), Shapiro (2005), Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006), Meier and Sprenger (2010), and 
Reuben, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009).   10
correctly solved anagram. Because the piece-rate wage we offered is a contingent payment, 
subjects’ reciprocity norm should not have been strongly activated in this task. Hence, the 
quantity of effort supplied by subjects equates the marginal cost of effort with the marginal 
benefit of the expected payment from exerting anagram-solving effort. Shifts in the amount of 
effort exerted across salience conditions reflect shifts in the marginal effort cost function.
13 By 
restricting the task length to five minutes, we reduced the chances that primed subjects’ religious 
identity salience would fade during the task.
  
We measured work provision in an incomplete contractual setting by running a labor 
market bilateral gift-exchange game (Fehr et al., 1998), modeled on one of the implementations 
of Charness, Frechette, and Kagel (2004). We paired subjects together and told them that one of 
them would play the role of the Manager and the other the role of the Employee. We described 
the roles in these terms so that subjects would be more likely to use norms applicable to labor 
markets in their choices. After playing once, subjects played the game again, but this time in the 
opposite role and with a different partner. 
In the first stage of the game, the Manager paid a wage to the Employee between $0 and 
$4 that is a multiple of 50 cents. The Manager could not change the wage later. In the second 
stage, the Employee saw the wage and chose a work quantity to supply that is an integer between 
1 and 10, inclusive. Employees were told that the Manager would be shown their work quantity 
choice. The Employee’s cost of work provided was an increasing convex function of work 
quantity: $0.00, $0.04, $0.08, $0.16, $0.24, $0.32, $0.40, $0.48, $0.60, and $0.72 as work 
quantity rose from 1 to 10. The Employee’s earnings were the wage received minus the cost of 
work provided. The Manager’s earnings were ($4 – wage paid) × work quantity provided by the 
Employee ÷ 10. 
To facilitate calculation, we provided subjects a lookup table that showed the Manager 
and Employee’s earnings at each wage and work quantity combination. Managers simply chose 
one wage, while Employees indicated a contingent work supply choice for each possible wage. 
After observing the Managers’ wage choice, we implemented the Employees’ work supply 
                                                 
13 In mathematical notation, let e be the quantity of effort supplied, with units normalized so that the expected 
number of anagrams solved in the five minutes allotted is equal to e. Let p be the payment in the numeraire good per 
anagram solved, and let the increasing convex function c(e) denote the utility cost of supplying effort. The subject’s 
utility function is U(e; p) = ep – c(e). As long as the optimal amount of effort e
* is interior, it is characterized by the 
first-order condition, c′(e
*) = p. Since p is the same across the treatment and control groups, changes in effort supply 
can be attributed to changes in the c′ function.   11
choice based on that wage. The profit-maximizing strategy for the Employee is to always supply 
the minimum amount of work, since the Manager is unable to contract on effort and has no 
opportunity to punish the Employee for shirking. If the Manager believes the Employee is a 
profit maximizer, his or her own profit-maximizing response is to offer a $0 wage. Despite these 
equilibrium predictions, the prior literature finds that, consistent with the presence of a 
reciprocity norm, Employees usually supply positive effort that is increasing in the wage offer. 
Managers anticipate this norm and rarely offer the minimum possible wage. 
Because the Employee’s work quantity is the choice of a number rather than effort in a 
real work task, and because the cost of providing this work quantity is determined by a function 
that is the same for all subjects, differences in work provided across salience conditions are 
driven solely by changes in the strength of subjects’ reciprocity norm and not by changes in the 
utility cost of effort. 
 
F. Post-experimental questionnaire 
At the end of the session, after payoffs had been revealed, subjects completed a 
questionnaire that collected information about their demographic characteristics, beliefs about 
the experiment, and religious beliefs. We also included numerous decoy questions to mask the 
purpose of the study, so that subjects would not contaminate future subjects by telling them that 
we were running an experiment about religion. We discuss responses to the relevant questions in 
further detail in Section III. 
 
III. Main Experiment Results 
A. Sample selection 
  Our sample consists of 264 Protestant/other Christians (whom we refer to collectively as 
“Protestants”), 199 Catholics, 95 Jews, and 269 atheists/agnostics.
14 We are not aware of existing 
hypotheses in the literature regarding how atheism or agnosticism might affect economic 
behavior. Moreover, it is possible that, among subjects who were raised in a faith and have 
subsequently abandoned it, religious identity salience makes salient the religious affiliation in 
                                                 
14 Since we analyze results separately by religion, it would be problematic if the priming manipulation affected how 
participants categorized themselves, e.g., causing marginal atheist/agnostics to identify themselves with the religion 
in which they were raised. We find that religious affiliations are almost perfectly balanced across treatment and 
control groups. In the treatment group, there are 130 Protestants, 101 Catholics, 43 Jews, and 136 atheists/agnostics, 
compared with 134, 98, 52, and 133 in the control group, respectively.   12
which the subject was raised. For these reasons, we do not attempt to interpret religious salience 
effects on atheists and agnostics. Nonetheless, we report results from all of the data we collected, 
including for this group. 
In the post-experimental questionnaire, we asked subjects, “What do you think this study 
is about?” To avoid estimating treatment effects that are driven by experimenter demand effects, 
the above sample of 827 excludes four subjects who guessed that the study had something to do 
with religion.
15 In addition, we have dropped four subjects who left more than half of the 
sentence-unscramble responses blank, since they were likely not to have been properly primed. 
Our results are not sensitive to including these dropped subjects. 
 
B. Public goods game 
  Panel A of Table 1 shows coefficients from regressing the amount contributed to the 
public good on a dummy for being in the religion-salient condition. The constant coefficients 
indicate that among unprimed subjects, Catholics contribute the most on average, agnostics and 
atheists contribute the least, and Protestants and Jews are in the middle. However, selection into 
our sample of Cornell students is not random. And even if our sample were representative of 
each religion’s members, the many unobserved variables that are correlated with religious 
affiliation would prevent us from inferring any causal effects of religion by simply comparing 
subject choices across religions. We instead turn to comparisons between the treatment and 
control groups within each religion, which identify the causal impact of religious identity 
salience using randomized variation. 
  We find that Protestant identity salience increases the willingness to contribute in a 
public goods game while Catholic identity salience suppresses it. Protestants for whom religious 
identity is salient contribute 15 cents more to the public good than control Protestants, whereas 
primed Catholics decrease their contributions by 18 cents. Jewish, atheist, and agnostic subjects’ 
contributions are not significantly affected by the prime. 
                                                 
15 In the post-experimental questionnaire, we also asked subjects whether they believed that their experimental 
choices would affect their payments as the instructions specified. Ninety percent of subjects reported believing these 
payment promises. Among the subjects who participated in the dictator, public goods, and gift exchange games, 88 
percent reported believing that their choices would affect other participants’ payments exactly as we had specified. 
Most economics experiments do not measure payment promise credibility. Our subjects’ rates of belief are much 
higher than those found in the Benjamin, Choi, and Strickland (2010) sample.   13
Putnam (1993), La Porta et al. (1997), and Ruffle and Sosis (2007) argue that the channel 
through which religion affects public goods provision is trust. Among Catholics, our data support 
the hypothesis that identity salience affects public goods contributions by changing the 
propensity to trust. Panel B of Table 1, which contains regressions of subjects’ expectations of 
other group members’ average contribution on a religion-salient dummy, indicates that relative 
to control Catholics, primed Catholics expect the average member of their group to contribute 12 
cents less. However, there is no significant effect of priming on Protestant, Jewish, or 
atheist/agnostic expectations. This suggests that Protestant identity salience’s positive effect on 
public good contributions in Panel A is not driven by a change in Protestants’ trust. 
Panel C shows that subjects’ reported expectations, despite being unincentivized, are 
nonetheless strongly predictive of their behavior. The coefficients in this panel are from a 
regression of contributions on a religion-salient dummy and the subject’s expectation of other 
group members’ average contribution. We find that subjects’ own contributions increase almost 
one-for-one with their expectations.
16 Once expectations are controlled for, primed Catholics do 
not contribute significantly less than unprimed Catholics, suggesting that the Catholic priming 
effect on contributions operates largely through Catholicism’s negative effect on trust. In 
contrast, primed Protestants contribute a highly significant 12 cents more than unprimed 
Protestants, even after controlling for expectations. The Protestant priming coefficient is 
statistically distinguishable from the Catholic priming coefficient at the 5 percent level. 
  
C. Risk aversion 
In the risk preference regression, our dependent variable is the minimum risk premium—
that is, the expected return offered by the gamble in excess of the risk-free return—that the 
subject requires to accept the gamble. For example, if X = $2.40 is the smallest X for which a 
subject would choose to gamble for a 50 percent chance of receiving X rather than accept a sure 
$1, then the reservation risk premium is (2.40 × 0.5 – 1)/1 = 0.20.
17 Because we observe binary 
                                                 
16 In untabulated regressions, we find that this relationship does not differ significantly between primed and 
unprimed subjects in any of the religious groups. 
17 In this formula, we treat the risk choice as investing a $1 endowment into either the risk-free or risky asset. Our 
decision to use the “minimum” risk premium as the dependent variable instead of the maximum risk premium that 
induces a safe choice only matters when participants’ risk choices are inconsistent, switching between choosing the 
safe option and the risky option at more than one value of X. Since 95 percent of participants behaved consistently, 
our results are virtually identical if we use the “maximum” risk premium instead. Similarly, our choice to use the   14
choices over only a finite number of risk premia, we use an interval regression (Stewart, 1983), 
which is a generalization of the tobit estimator that accommodates dependent variable values that 
are not precisely observed but are known to lie somewhere within an interval. We observe two 
risk premia for each subject—one for the small-stakes gamble and one for the larger-stakes 
gamble—so each subject appears in the regression twice, and we cluster standard errors by 
subject (Froot, 1989; Rogers, 1993). 
  Table 2 shows that priming religious identity causes the average risk premium required to 
entice agnostics and atheists to forego a sure payout to fall significantly by 12 percentage points. 
For the small-stakes gamble, this represents a fall from 16 percent to 4 percent. This effect is 
driven almost entirely by the agnostics. We also find evidence that religious identity salience 
causes Catholics’ risk premium to fall by 11 percentage points. This is a drop from 21 percent to 
10 percent for the small-stakes gamble. The effect is significant only at the 10 percent level in 
this regression specification, but if we additionally control for a gender dummy (which is highly 
significant), the priming effect point estimate becomes significant at the 5 percent level. We find 
no significant identity salience effects on risk-taking for Protestants and Jews. 
Our results are consistent with identity salience contributing to Kumar, Page, and Spalt’s 
(2011) conclusion that Catholics are more risk-seeking than Protestants. But whereas they argue 
that the difference is due to Protestantism depressing risk tolerance, in our data, the wedge 
identity salience creates is instead driven by Catholics becoming more risk-seeking.
18 
 
D. Discount rate 
  In the time preference regression, our dependent variable is the log of the minimum 
continuously compounded weekly interest rate that the subject requires to choose the later 
payment. That is, we apply the log operator once to transform the reservation gross interest rate 
into the continuously compounded net interest rate, and then we apply the log operator again. 
The second application of the log operator causes the estimator we describe below to assume that 
reservation continuously compounded interest rates are conditionally log-normal, thus ruling out 
                                                                                                                                                             
“minimum” interest rate in our time preference regressions in Section IV.D does not matter because 97 percent of 
participants had a unique interest rate switch point. 
18 Although it is not the focus of their paper, Hilary and Hui (2009) find suggestive evidence that priming religion 
increases risk aversion in a sample of 120 undergraduates. It is difficult to directly compare their results with ours 
because they report only full-sample results and not the religious composition of their sample, they report only p-
values (0.20 and 0.08 for their two regressions) rather than effect sizes, they use a different priming instrument, and 
their subjects made only two risk choices that are both hypothetical.   15
negative discount rates. Each subject appears in the regression twice because we have two 
discount rate observations: now versus one week in the future, and one week versus two weeks 
in the future. Therefore, we cluster our standard errors by subject. 
As in the risk preference elicitation, we only observe binary choices at a finite number of 
interest rates. Therefore, we use interval regressions to estimate subjects’ reservation interest 
rates. In the interest rate regressions that follow, if the coefficients imply that a certain set of 
explanatory variable values is associated with a mean log continuously compounded interest rate 
of ˆ μ, then the median continuously compounded interest rate is exp( ˆ μ). 
Table 3 presents the regression evidence on how priming religious identity affects 
discount rates. The explanatory variables are a dummy for being in the religion-salient condition 
and a dummy for the intertemporal choice being between payments deferred for one week versus 
two weeks. In no case do we find that religious identity salience affects discount rates in a 
statistically significant way. Moreover, the point estimates of the priming effect are positive for 
all religions. If religion promotes thrift and capital accumulation (Weber, 1930; Guiso, Sapienza, 
and Zingales, 2003; Barro and McCleary, 2003 and 2006), it appears to do so through channels 
other than identity salience. 
 
E. Dictator game 
  Despite having incentives to keep their entire $1 endowment for themselves, dictators in 
our dictator game usually gave away a positive amount of money to the subject with whom they 
were paired, although the proportion given away was far less than half on average. This is a 
typical result for dictator game experiments (e.g., Forsythe et al., 1994). Table 4 contains 
coefficients from regressing the amount of money given away on a dummy for being in the 
religion-salient condition. The constant terms indicate that when unprimed, the average amount 
given away is between 14 and 22 cents, depending on the religious group.  
The coefficients on the religion-salient dummy show that the prime does not induce any 
of the religious groups to give away significantly more money. The Protestant and Catholic 
priming effect point estimates are in fact negative.  
Thus, we fail to replicate the Shariff and Norenzyan (2007) and Ahmed and Salas (2011) 
findings that priming religion increases generosity in a dictator game, even though we use the   16
same priming instrument as Shariff and Norenzayan and a similar one as Ahmed and Salas.
19 
Neither paper reports results separately by religion, but a rough meta-analysis using full-sample 
results points to a very small, positive, and insignificant effect overall. Assuming independence 
between Shariff and Norenzayan’s Study 1 (β = 0.238, s.e. = 0.0645, N = 50), their Study 2 (β = 
0.200, s.e. = 0.0810, N = 50), Ahmed and Salas’ experiment (β = 0.0714, s.e. = 0.0217, N = 224), 
and our experiment (β = -0.034, s.e. = 0.0214, N = 563), the combined estimate of the priming 




F. Labor market tasks 
  In the anagram solving task, our subjects on average supplied answers for around 30 
anagrams during the five minutes allotted to them. But contrary to the hypothesis that religious 
identity salience will decrease the cost of work effort, the regression in Table 5 of anagrams 
attempted on a dummy for being in the religion-salient condition shows that priming religious 
identity does not significantly affect the number of anagrams attempted among any of our 
religious groups. The point estimate of the priming effect on Protestants, who were the object of 
Weber’s (1930) Protestant work ethic hypothesis, is in fact negative, although this is not 
significantly different from zero. In untabulated analysis, we have instead used the number of 
anagrams correctly answered as the dependent regression variable and find qualitatively similar 
results. 
  Labor supply effects in the bilateral gift-exchange game are summarized in Figure 1, 
which plots the average amount Employees chose to expend on work-related costs for each wage 
offer. Among all religious groups and experimental conditions, minimal labor is supplied at a $0 
                                                 
19 Our results may differ because our subjects performed several tasks after the priming manipulation, while Shariff 
and Norenzayan’s subjects played only the dictator game, and Ahmed and Salas’s subjects played the dictator game 
immediately after the prime. However, when we restrict our analysis to the sessions where the dictator game was the 
very first task after the prime, we still do not find an effect in any religious group. Pooling across religious groups to 
make our results maximally comparable to Shariff and Norenzayan’s, we find a coefficient of -0.016 and a standard 
error of 0.035 in this subsample of 222 individuals. 
20 To conduct this calculation, we divide Shariff and Norenzayan’s and Ahmed and Salas’s coefficients and standard 
errors by their stake sizes in order to put all of the findings in units of allocating a $1 endowment. In analyzing 
Shariff and Norenzayan’s Study 2, we ignore their second treatment group (which received a non-religious prime). 
Of course, it is possible that there are unpublished data that would be relevant for this meta-analysis, but we do not 
have access to those findings.   17
wage offer.
21 The amount Employees are willing to expend on work-related costs rises nearly 
linearly with wage offers between $0 and $3.50, indicating a strong reciprocity norm. In 
measuring reciprocity, we will ignore labor supply at a $4 wage because at this wage, the 
Manager’s earnings are always $0 regardless of how much labor the Employee supplies. 
Therefore, any positive work-related expenditures by the Employee at a $4 wage represents 
either intentional money burning as a gesture of goodwill and appreciation or confusion about 
the payoff formulas. Labor supply is usually lower at a $4 wage than at a $3.50 wage. 
It is readily apparent from Figure 1 that the strength of reciprocity, as reflected in the 
slope of work expenditures with respect to wages between $0 and $3.50, increases greatly among 
primed Jews relative to unprimed Jews. Other religious groups’ reciprocity does not appear to be 
nearly as affected by priming. We formally analyze the priming effect on Employees’ reciprocity 
in Panel A of Table 6. The dependent variable in the regression is the subject-specific slope 
coefficient from a regression of the subject’s work-related costs on wage offers from $0 to $3.50. 
Jewish identity significantly increases this slope from 0.05 to 0.11, but there are no significant 
effects for any other group. 
  Panel B of Table 6 examines the effect of priming religious identity on wages offered by 
Managers. There is to our knowledge no clearly articulated hypothesis in the prior literature 
about religion’s effect on managerial wage offers, but we report these results for completeness.
22 
The regression of managerial wage offers on a dummy for being in the religion-salient condition 
shows no significant effects of religious identity. 
 
G. Multiple hypothesis testing and Type I error 
  Although all of the main hypotheses we have tested correspond to existing hypotheses in 
the literature, the number of tests we have run is large, and many of the priming effects are 
insignificant. This raises the concern that our significant priming effects are chance artifacts 
arising from the large number of tested hypotheses. 
                                                 
21 The absence of positive religious identity salience effects on purely altruistic labor provision in the gift-exchange 
game at a $0 wage is consistent with the lack of religious identity salience effects on pure altruism in the dictator 
game. 
22 However, since one motivation for a Manager to pay a positive wage is that he or she expects the Employee to 
reciprocate the kindness, one might expect that hypotheses about religious identity effects on trust in the public 
goods context would also apply to Managerial wage offers. Our results are not consistent with this extension and 
instead suggest that Catholic identity salience effects on trust are specific to public good contexts.   18
  To address this possibility, we test whether the priming effects we estimated on public 
good contributions, expectations of others’ public good contributions, risk aversion, discount 
rates, dictator game generosity, anagrams attempted, and gift-exchange reciprocity are jointly 
equal to zero. We pool all of our observations into a single interval regression and control for 
outcome type dummies (e.g., a dummy for the dependent variable being a public good 
contribution amount, a dummy for the dependent variable being an amount given away in the 
dictator game, etc.), outcome type dummies × religion dummies, and outcome type dummies × 
religion dummies × additional outcome-specific control variables. Interval regressions can 
accommodate dependent variables that are point observations as a special case. We allow the 
residual’s variance to vary by religion × outcome type and cluster standard errors by subject. 
This procedure causes every individual priming coefficient value we previously estimated to 
appear in a single coefficient vector, allowing us to run a Wald test for their joint equality with 
zero. We reject this hypothesis at p = 0.006.
23 
 
H. Treatment interactions with belief in divine punishment and religious service attendance 
  In this subsection, we examine whether the priming effects we have identified as 
significant for Christians or Jews differ for subjects with a stronger belief in divine punishment 
or more regular religious service attendance. Barro and McCleary (2003, 2006) find that the 
positive association between religion and GDP growth appears to operate most strongly through 
belief in the existence of hell, which could be a powerful motivator of behavior. In contrast, they 
find a negative association between GDP growth and the frequency of religious service 
attendance. Although Barro and McCleary interpret this negative relationship as arising from 
religious service attendance being a proxy for real resources being diverted to religious activities 
rather than economic production, it is possible that identity effects operate differently for 
frequent attendees than infrequent attendees, even holding beliefs about the afterlife fixed. 
  Our post-experimental questionnaire asked a subset of our subjects to rate on a six-point 
Likert scale their agreement with the statement, “God punishes people for their sins.” We 
normalize this variable so that within each religious group, it has a zero mean and unit variance. 
We also asked all subjects how often they attend religious services. Possible answers were 
                                                 
23 We exclude the priming effect on Managers’ wage offers from this joint hypothesis test because there is no strong 
ex ante hypothesis from the literature about how religion would affect this dependent variable. If we include it, the 
p-value for the joint hypothesis test is 0.015.   19
“never,” “less than once a month,” “once a month,” “a few times a month,” “once a week,” “a 
few times a week,” “once a day,” and “more than once a day.” We create an indicator variable 
for whether the subject’s attendance frequency is above the median for his or her religious group. 
Median attendance frequency is once a month for Protestants, less than once a month for 
Catholics and Jews, and never for atheists and agnostics.
24 
  Table 7 shows regressions where the explanatory variables include an interaction of the 
religion-salient dummy with either the strength of belief in divine punishment or with the 
indicator for greater-than-median frequency of religious service attendance. To keep the number 
of interaction regressions manageable, we limit attention to the dependent variables and religious 
groups where we found statistically significant main effects of priming. For the sake of brevity, 
we omit from the table regressions with Catholic trust as the dependent variable, since these 
results are similar to those from regressions with Catholic public good contributions as the 
dependent variable. We also omit regressions involving agnostics and atheists because 
interactions with religious belief or religious service attendance are difficult to interpret for this 
group. 
  We find no statistically significant interactions of religious identity effects with 
attendance frequency or belief in divine punishment among Protestants and Catholics. Among 
Jews, we find that the increase in Employee reciprocity in response to the religious prime occurs 
primarily among those who attend religious services relatively infrequently. 
 
IV. A Theoretical Framework for Interpreting Priming Effects 
To provide a perspective on why identity salience affects behavior and what can be 
inferred from it, we discuss a theoretical framework that formalizes the “self-categorization 
theory” perspective from the psychology literature (James, 1890; Turner, 1985). This framework, 
which is inspired by Akerlof and Kranton (2000), is developed in Benjamin, Choi, and 
Strickland (2010). Here we elaborate on it, especially emphasizing what cannot be inferred from 
identity salience effects, even if the self-categorization theory interpretation is taken as given. 
 
                                                 
24 We find no systematic differences in either the belief or attendance variables across treatment and control groups, 
with the exception that primed Jews report substantially higher belief in divine punishment (p < .05). The 
coefficients on belief in divine punishment and its interaction with the treatment dummy are essentially zero in the 
gift-exchange reciprocity regression among Jews in Table 7, so differences in this belief across the Jewish 
experimental groups are unlikely to be driving the Jewish reciprocity treatment effect.   20
The basic idea is that priming a social category temporarily increases the strength of 
affiliation with that category. Stronger affiliation with a category causes behavior to shift 
towards that category’s norms, so comparing primed and unprimed behavior allows us to infer 
something about what the category’s norms are and how they affect steady-state behavior. 
Let x be some choice, such as how much to contribute to a public good or how much to 
trust a stranger. An individual belongs to a social category C, such as Protestant, with strength s 
≥ 0. Let x0 denote the individual’s preferred choice in the absence of identity considerations, and 
let xC denote the choice prescribed for members of social category C. The individual chooses x to 
maximize 
 U  = –(1 – w(s))(x – x0)
2 – w(s)(x – xC)
2, (1) 
where 0 ≤ w(s) ≤ 1 is the weight placed on the norm for social category C in the person’s 
decision. We assume that w(0) = 0 and w′ > 0. Deviating from the norm prescribed for one’s 
category causes disutility that is increasing in s. We assume that s has a steady-state value s but 
can be temporarily increased to s + ε, where ε > 0, by a category prime that makes the 
category’s norms more cognitively accessible and hence more influential on behavior. 
The first-order condition of (1) gives the optimal action, x
*(s) = (1 – w(s))x0 + w(s)xC,  
which is a weighted average of the preferred action without identity considerations and the 
category norm. This condition yields several implications: 
 
1.  The higher the steady-state strength s of the category affiliation, the closer x
* is to xC in 
steady state. 
2.  A category prime also causes x
* to move closer to xC. Thus, the behavioral effect of 
priming social category C reveals the marginal behavioral effect of increasing the steady-
state strength s of C. This makes priming manipulations a useful experimental procedure 
for studying how identity affects steady-state choices.  
3.  The sign of the priming treatment effect, x
*(s + ε) – x
*(s) ≈ (dx
*/ds)ε = w′(s)(xC – x0)ε, 
depends on the sign of xC – x0. Even if the s, x0, and w(·) of an experimental sample 
differ from those of the general population affiliated with C, the directional effects of   21




Psychologists have tested the category salience mechanism by priming social categories 
with norms that are believed to be known and confirming that choices shift towards these norms. 
For example, LeBoeuf, Shafir, and Belyavsky (2010) find that undergraduate subjects are more 
likely to prefer highbrow periodicals and films when their “scholar” social category is primed 
than when their “socialite” social category is primed. Chinese-American subjects make more 
collectivist choices when their Chinese social category is primed rather than their American 
social category. If subjects make a choice while one social category is salient, they are 
subsequently more dissatisfied with that choice if a different social category is salient at the time 
of post-choice evaluation than if the same social category remains salient. Reicher and Levine 
(1994) find that undergraduate science majors express more favorable attitudes towards practices 
such as animal vivisection when their scientist identity category is made salient, and Forehand, 
Deshpandé, and Reed (2001) find that making subjects’ ethnicity salient causes them to evaluate 
a same-ethnicity spokesperson more favorably. Inverting the approach in these papers by taking 
the validity of the category salience mechanism as given and priming categories with unknown 
norms, we obtain information about the norms from the resulting shift in choices.  
  Importantly, this framework also provides a way to think about the limitations of priming 
techniques for identifying norms: 
 
4.  Although the direction of the priming effect reliably identifies the sign of xC – x0, 
differences in the priming effect’s magnitude across people may arise through a number 
of channels. Assume without loss of generality that xC > x0. Priming will have a larger 
effect if the identity norm is more extreme (i.e., xC is larger) or the person’s preferred 
action in the absence of identity considerations is more extreme in the opposite direction 
(i.e., x0 is smaller). Priming will also have a larger effect if the salience manipulation is 
more effective at increasing identity salience for that particular person (i.e., ε is larger) or 
the person’s choices are more sensitive to a given change in identity salience (i.e., w′ is 
                                                 
25 The sign of xC – x0 might differ also because xC in a sample differs from that in the general population affiliated 
with C. This could occur, for example, if identity norms differ across subgroups within a religious category—such 
as different denominations within Protestantism—and the mix of subgroups differs between the sample and the 
general population affiliated with that category.   22
larger). This latter difference can arise either because the w function has a different shape 
or because the person has a different steady-state s, so that the points at which she 
evaluates the w function differ. Because it is difficult to interpret differences in priming 
effect magnitudes, we have focused on estimating the priming effect within a religious 
identity category, rather than a difference-in-difference analysis of priming effects across 
religious categories. 
5.  Priming will not reveal social category effects that operate exclusively through x0 rather 
than xC. For example, many Koreans enjoy eating spicy foods, and this preference would 
probably be weaker if they were not born into the Korean social category. However, if 
eating spicy food is simply a taste that Koreans develop because Korean culture exposes 
them to spicy foods as children (i.e., a shift in x0 caused by category membership), and 
refraining from spicy foods is not thought to make one a “bad” or “disloyal” Korean (i.e., 
there is no xC associated with the spiciness of a Korean’s diet, so the second additive term 
in equation (1) is missing), then priming the Korean social category will not cause 
Koreans to eat spicier foods. 
6.  There will be no difference between primed and unprimed choices in domains where the 
choice situation itself functions as a strong social category prime. For example, a Jew 
who is strictly kosher will have his Jewish identity primed whenever he is presented with 
the choice to eat pork. He will always refuse to eat the pork whether or not an additional 
Jewish category cue is present. Our intuition is that choice situations to which a person 
considers the social category norm to be strictly and unambiguously applicable are more 
likely to be primes in themselves.
26 
 
Points 5 and 6 imply that null priming effects need not be interpreted as definitive 
evidence against the existence of social category effects in a particular domain.  
 
V. Conclusion 
  In our data, we find that religious identity salience among Protestants causes increased 
contributions to public goods, while religious identity salience among Catholics causes decreased 
                                                 
26 Thus, we hypothesize that priming the Jewish category would make a Jew who occasionally keeps kosher outside 
the Jewish holidays more likely to refuse pork, since she both places some weight on the kosher norm in her utility 
function and is not likely to be thinking about it during an eating situation without the prime.   23
contributions to public goods, lower expectations of others’ contributions to public goods, and 
decreased risk aversion. Religious identity salience among Jews increases labor market 
reciprocity. However, we find no evidence that religious identity salience affects discount rates 
or purely altruistic generosity. 
  We conclude with two notes of caution in interpreting our findings. First, when we fail to 
find an effect of identity salience, it does not necessarily rule out the effect’s existence. It is 
possible that we did not have sufficient statistical power to detect the effect, or that a stronger 
salience manipulation would have produced a detectable effect. It is also possible that the 
strength of our identity salience manipulation varies by religious group, making us more likely to 
find null effects in some groups than others. Hence, our positive findings merit greater emphasis 
than our null findings. 
  Second, while a key advantage of identity salience manipulations is that they can be 
randomly assigned, exogenously manipulating identity salience is not the same thing as 
exogenously manipulating religious affiliation. For example, making religious identity salient is 
a different experiment than raising a child in a different religious tradition. According to self-
categorization theory, identity salience effects identify the marginal directional effect of religious 
identity norms. Thus, identity salience manipulations provide information regarding one 
channel—identity norms—through which religion might affect behavior. But regardless of the 
mechanisms responsible for our identity salience effects, religious identity will be salient outside 
the laboratory some of the time to members of a particular religious category, so identity salience 
manipulations allow us to measure how behavior is likely to be affected by identity affiliation 
during those times. Therefore, we believe that identity salience manipulations—interpreted 
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 Table 1. Public Goods Game Results 
 Protestant  Catholic  Jewish  Agnostic/Atheist
Panel A. Amount contributed to public good 
Religion salient  0.15* -0.18**  0.01  0.12 
  (0.06) (0.07)  (0.12)  (0.06) 
Constant 0.53**  0.70**  0.56**  0.49** 
 (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.04) 
N  180 138  56  168 
Panel B. Expectation of others’ contribution to public good 
Religion salient  0.03 -0.12*  0.08  0.09 
  (0.05) (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.05) 
Constant 0.59**  0.73**  0.61**  0.52** 
 (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.03) 
N  180 138  56  168 
Panel C. Relationship between own contribution and expectation of others’ contribution 
Religion salient  0.12** -0.07  -0.07  0.04 
  (0.04) (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.05) 
E(Others’ contribution)  0.90** 0.94**  1.01**  0.95** 
  (0.05) (0.06)  (0.11)  (0.07) 
Constant -0.00  0.01  -0.06  -0.01 
 (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.04) 
N  180 138  56  168 
Note: This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the amount contributed to the public good 
(Panels A and C) or the expectation of others’ average contribution to the public good (Panel B). Religion salient is 
a dummy for being in the religion-salient condition. E(Others’ contribution) is the subject’s expectation of other 
group members’ average contribution. Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses below the point estimates. 
* Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
  Table 2. Risk Aversion Results 
 
Protestant Catholic  Jewish 
Agnostic/ 
Atheist 
Religion salient  -0.03 -0.11 0.02  -0.12* 
  (0.06) (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
Larger Stakes  0.27** 0.31**  0.26**  0.26** 
 (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.04) 
Constant 0.23**  0.21**  0.09*  0.16** 
 (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
ˆ σ   0.39 0.36  0.26  0.32 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
N  242 154  80  196 
Note: This table presents interval regressions where the latent dependent variable is the minimum risk premium 
required for a subject to accept a gamble. We pool each subject’s two risk choices together. Religion salient is a 
dummy for being in the religion-salient condition. Larger stakes is a dummy for if the sure payout in the risky 
choice was $100. The estimated conditional standard deviation of the latent dependent variable is denoted by  ˆ. σ  
Huber-White standard errors, clustered by subject, are reported in parentheses below the point estimates. The final 
row shows the number of reservation risk premium intervals in the regressions. * Significant at the 5 percent level. 




Table 3. Discount Rate Results 
 Protestant  Catholic  Jewish  Agnostic/Atheist
Religion salient  0.21 0.43  0.33  0.08 
  (0.36) (0.50)  (0.57)  (0.51) 
1 week vs. 2 weeks  0.01 -0.17  -0.37  -0.30 
 (0.11)  (0.17)  (0.27)  (0.17) 
Constant -2.96**  -3.53**  -3.62**  -4.40** 
 (0.26)  (0.36)  (0.44)  (0.42) 
ˆ σ   1.99 2.18  1.85  2.36 
 (0.16)  (0.21)  (0.20)  (0.18) 
N  242 154  80  196 
Note: This table presents interval regressions where the latent dependent variable is the log continuously 
compounded interest rate required to defer payment receipt. We pool each subject’s two intertemporal choices 
together. Religion salient is a dummy for being in the religion-salient condition. 1 week vs. 2 weeks is a dummy for 
the intertemporal choice being between payments deferred for one week versus two weeks. The estimated 
conditional standard deviation of the latent dependent variable is denoted by  ˆ. σ  Huber-White standard errors, 
clustered by subject, are reported in parentheses below the point estimates. The final row of each panel reports the 




    Table 4. Dictator Game Results 
 Protestant  Catholic  Jewish  Agnostic/Atheist
Religion salient  -0.03 -0.04 0.01  -0.05 
  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.03) 
Constant 0.22**  0.17**  0.14**  0.17** 
 (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.02) 
N  186 139  62  176 
Note: This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the amount given away. Religion salient is 
a dummy for being in the religion-salient condition. Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses below the point 
estimates. ** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
Table 5. Number of Anagrams Attempted 
 Protestant  Catholic  Jewish  Agnostic/Atheist
Religion salient  -1.48 1.76  4.92  2.12 
  (2.53) (3.98)  (5.99)  (2.63) 
Constant 29.80**  31.09**  33.65**  32.02** 
 (1.89)  (2.89)  (4.48)  (1.78) 
N  78 60 33  93 
Note: This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the number of anagrams attempted in the 
anagram-solving task. Religion salient is a dummy for being in the religion-salient condition. Huber-White standard 
errors are in parentheses below the point estimates. ** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 6. Bilateral Gift-Exchange Game Results 
 Protestant  Catholic  Jewish  Agnostic/Atheist
Panel A. Slope from regression of work cost on wages between $0 and $3.50 
Religion salient  0.01 0.01  0.06*  -0.02 
  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
Constant 0.08**  0.08**  0.05**  0.09** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
N  104 91 40  113 
Panel B. Wage offered as manager 
Religion salient  0.02 0.01  0.42 -0.28 
  (0.19) (0.19)  (0.29)  (0.18) 
Constant 1.41**  1.28**  0.98**  1.57** 
 (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.21)  (0.12) 
N  104 91 40  113 
Note: This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the subject-specific slope coefficient from 
a regression of work cost expended as an Employee on managerial wage offered (Panel A) or the wage offered as a 
Manager (Panel B). Religion salient is a dummy for being in the religion-salient condition. Huber-White standard 






































Figure 1. Average Employee work costs chosen in response to managerial wage offers in 
gift exchange game. 
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